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Beyond the restorative turn
The limits of legal humanitarianism
sara kendall
Introduction
International criminal law has been historically concerned with individual
accountability, informed by a punitive conception of justice designed to hold
perpetrators accountable for crimes. As a sub-field within the broader
discipline of public international law, with its focus on the agency of states,
international criminal law’s emphasis on the individual has been interpreted
as indexing a shift from a paradigm of state sovereignty to human security,
in terms of both accountability (of perpetrators) and rights (of victims).1
This shift has been furthered by an emerging recognition of the figure of the
victim, with links to the broader conflict-affected communities to which
individual victims belong. In the case of the permanent International
Criminal Court (ICC), the moral call to alleviate suffering is translated
into participatory rights for individual victims before the Court, as well as
the mandate of its affiliated Trust Fund for Victims to provide medical and
livelihood assistance to conflict-affected communities. As an ICC guidebook
explains, ‘victims at the ICC enjoy rights that have never before been
incorporated in the mandate of an international criminal court’.2
Yet the Court’s claim to alleviate suffering brings its work into a
relationship with other humanitarian discourses and practices outside
of international law. How might this inclusion of relief to conflict-
affected communities be related to shifts in governance and development
I thank Christian De Vos, Nesam McMillan and Sarah Nouwen for their comments on this
chapter, as well as the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) for funding
the field research that informs this account.
1 R. Teitel, Humanity’s Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
2 ‘Victims Before the International Criminal Court: A Guide for the Participation of Victims
in the Proceedings of the Court’, www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/8FF91A2C-5274-4DCB-
9CCE-37273C5E9AB4/282477/160910VPRSBookletEnglish.pdf.
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beyond the juridical field, as with development aid and the provision of
medical assistance? Can a body of law that has been traditionally oriented
towards accountability through punishment – ‘ending impunity’ – be recast
as a site of restorative justice, and with what expressive andmaterial effects?
This chapter locates the restorative work of the ICC against the back-
drop of humanitarianism: the transformation of moral sentiment into
material practices that seek to reduce suffering.3 Such a reading draws
upon critiques of humanitarianism from beyond the legal field, including
anthropology, history and political theory, which seek to diagnose its
theoretical and material effects. International criminal law’s restorative
turn harbours common sentiments that link it to broader forms of
humanitarian government, which anthropologist Didier Fassin defines
as ‘the set of procedures established and actions conducted in order to
manage, regulate, and support the existence of human beings’.4 The
ICC’s practices of victim participation and aid provision operate as
forms of what can be termed ‘legal humanitarianism’, which seeks to
alleviate conflict-affected suffering and assert rights claims through inter-
national criminal law. Legal humanitarianism routes its governance
objectives through humanitarian logics, yet it is limited by the framework
of law, which provides jurisdictional constraints that other humanitarian
forms do not encounter to the same degree.
The chapter seeks to illustrate the limits of routing restorative justice
practices through a historically punitive legal field. These limits – and the
injustices they produce – are not necessarily a product of the ICC as an
institution, but are rather a by-product of trying to bend a retributive
field to suit restorative aims. Asking a field oriented around judgment
and punishment to provide recognition and redress to conflict-affected
communities leads to a form of justice that might be better described as
liminal rather than transitional, unintentionally producing exclusions,
deferrals and marginalisations that have been largely neglected in the
literature on the ICC’s restorative mandate. In this sense legal humani-
tarianism operates as a form of governance, mobilising ICC states parties
3 See generally M. Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2011); D. Fassin, Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the
Present (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012); and I. Feldman and M. Ticktin
(eds.), In the Name of Humanity: The Government of Threat and Care (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2010).
4 Fassin continues: ‘government includes but exceeds the intervention of the state, local
administrations, international bodies, and political institutions more generally’. Fassin,
Humanitarian Reason, 1.
beyond the restorative turn 353
Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 129.12.30.206 on Thu Dec 17 14:40:23 GMT 2015.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139924528.017
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2015
and in-country donor states, non-governmental and community-based
organisations and the Court itself in projects of classifying and categoris-
ing conflict-affected populations through legal logics.
The chapter first takes up the contested figure of the human in inter-
national law, which carries resonances in contemporary legal humani-
tarianism. It then locates international criminal law’s ‘restorative turn’ in
relation to the broader rise of human rights discourse towards the end of
the twentieth century. Reading legal humanitarianism in relation to other
critiques of humanitarian practice, the following section brings interna-
tional criminal law’s restorative turn into dialogue with historical and
anthropological literature. Moving from a theoretical consideration of
legal humanitarianism, the two sections that follow draw upon empirical
material, both from official ICC literature and from observations of
Court practice, to consider the Court’s victim participation regime and
the ICC Trust Fund’s assistance mandate. The chapter concludes by
considering the implications of reading international criminal law’s
restorative turn as a novel form of post-conflict governance, and what
the risks and limitations may be of routing restorative justice through a
retributive legal frame.
Between triumph and scepticism
Despite more than half a century separating them from our ‘humanitar-
ian present’,5 two claims mark competing poles in contemporary debates
about the role of international law in securing the figure of the human.
On one side of the spectrum, the Nuremberg Military Tribunal declared
that ‘[h]umanity can assert itself by law’, already suggesting the founda-
tional role that will be ascribed to post-World War II trials by contem-
porary proponents of international criminal tribunals.6 Here the tribunal
conflates its own agency in prosecuting those suspected of international
crimes with another actor, ‘humanity’, which can now ‘assert itself by law’
and enforce its own (inherent) human rights. On the other side, Hannah
Arendt’s well-known account of the vulnerability of refugees and state-
less people continues to inform sceptics who question the viability of
human rights claims in a world where rights are still largely civil and
5 See E. Weizman, The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to
Gaza (London: Verso, 2011).
6 United States v. Ohlendorf (The Einsatzgruppen Case), reprinted in 4 Trials of War
Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10,
411 (1946–1953) 112. As cited in Teitel, Humanity’s Law, 77.
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political creatures, existing between a state and its citizens rather than
inherent to humanity itself.7
Half a century later, scholarship on international criminal law and
human rights continues to inhabit a spectrum between these poles of
triumph and scepticism, moving between a ‘utopian’ cosmopolitan
vision of law and an ‘apologist’ deference to state sovereignty.8 The
main points of contention have remainedmore or less the same, focusing
on the extent to which human rights can be protected at the international
level through prosecuting international crimes. What has changed is a
developing claim that different sub-fields of international law, such as
human rights law and international humanitarian law, are growing closer
together at a normative level and in legal practice.9 This normative
convergence is explained in different ways, though increasingly the
ideal of ‘human security’ and related references to humanity or humani-
tarianism have appeared within the discourse of international criminal
law.10 In its landmark jurisdictional decision in Tadic, for example, the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
claimed that the dichotomy between interstate and intrastate conflicts
was being broken down in international law, and ‘the State-sovereignty-
oriented approach . . . has been gradually supplanted by a human-being-
oriented approach’.11 Distinctions between conflict and peacetime and
between international and internal conflicts have been unsettled by an
international criminal law jurisprudence that at times overtly references
humanity both as its beneficiary and as its ground.
Expressions of humanitarian sentiment in the discourse of interna-
tional criminal law have become commonplace. They are threaded
throughout official ICC statements as well as in commentary from civil
society organisations and diplomats who promote the ICC’s work. Even
representatives from the United States, a state not party to the ICC, have
linked humanitarianism with state security in expressing support for
7 H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (San Diego: Harcourt, 1968), 279.
8 M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
9 T. Meron, The Humanization of International Law (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2006).
10 For links between human security and international criminal law, see L. Axelworthy,
‘Human Security and Global Governance: Putting People First’, Global Governance, 7
(2001), 19–23.
11 Appeal on Jurisdiction, Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94–1-AR72, Appeals Chamber, ICTY, 2
October 1995.
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international criminal legal institutions.12 Others have pressed farther,
contending that this traditionally retributive field works to alleviate the
suffering of conflict-affected populations. A representative from a
European state’s claim to the president of the ICC’s Assembly of States
Parties offers a telling example of how criminal justice’s traditional
concerns with accountability and deterrence have become bound up
with the more abstract aims of human security and social repair:
A substantial number of victims have already been uplifted because they
believe in your ability to deliver justice. And more victims will benefit in
the future, not only thanks to the Court’s reparative mandate, but mainly
because of its firm effect to deter grave crimes against humanity.13
This claim from a state representative reflects a common sentiment
expressed by other states supporting what is referred to as the ICC’s
‘restorative mandate’.14 In this account of the Court’s work, victims are
‘uplifted’ through a belief in the form of justice that the ICC dispenses,
which is seen to be both reparative and deterrent. Court proponents
frequently describe accountability, deterrence and reparation as forming
a constellation of objectives that are thought to be attainable through the
field of international criminal law.
In addition to linking the field to human and state security, tribunal
observers and officials have claimed that international criminal law
institutions can lessen the suffering brought about through mass conflict.
The language of bearing witness has been supplemented with claims
about ‘giving voice’, rehabilitating and repairing the harms done to
victims of international crimes through criminal processes. These claims
suggest that the field has turned towards restorative forms of justice to
supplement its objectives of holding individual perpetrators of grave
crimes to account.
12 Harold Koh has claimed that ‘the United States has long recognized that international
criminal justice, and accountability for those responsible for atrocities, is in our national
security interests as well as in our humanitarian interests’. H. Koh, ‘International
Criminal Justice 5.0’, New York City, 8 November 2012, available online at www.state.
gov/s/l/releases/remarks/200957.htm.
13 Statement by Swedish Ambassador Per Sjögren, Deputy Director-General, Ministry for
Foreign Affairs, at the 12th Session of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute,
The Hague, 21 November 2013.
14 For example, at the 12th ASP, the representative from Finland noted that ‘reparations are
at the heart of the restorative mandate of the Court’. Victim plenary, 12th Session of the
Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute, 22 November 2013, author’s notes.
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International criminal law’s ‘restorative turn’
Understanding the contemporary interest in restorative justice and the
figure of the victim in international criminal law entails placing it in the
broader historical context of this retributive legal field. Proponents of
what is now called international criminal law draw a line back to the
post-World War II military tribunals constituted by the allied powers at
Nuremberg and Tokyo.15 The field of international criminal law
expanded in the period following the Cold War, contributing to the
‘tribunalisation’ of conflict.16 As critics have noted, however, privileging
criminal accountability comes at the expense of alternate political values,
such as inclusion and membership.17 Negotiated political settlements
would permit perpetrators to become part of a new regime, whereas the
logic of international criminal law entails casting perpetrators as crim-
inals and excluding them from the future formation of a polity. The field
privileges punishment over reconciliation, producing what Sarah
Nouwen and Wouter Werner have referred to as a kind of Schmittian
distinction between ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ of the ‘international
community’.18
It would seem that such a focus on the figure of the criminal in need of
punishment cuts against more transitional objectives of reconciliation
and repair, as accountability begins from a premise of isolating indivi-
duals and attributing blame rather than reconciling communities. In this
sense the restorative turn, emerging through the Rome Statute negotia-
tions of the mid-1990s, harbours more of a humanitarian objective than
an alignment with the aims of transitional justice. As the reach of inter-
national criminal law has extended, the field has become increasingly
bound up with humanitarian logics and a focus on the figure of the victim
in need of care. In her contribution to this volume, anthropologist
Kamari Clarke explains that the UN General Assembly’s 1985
15 Most standard textbooks of the field typically begin fromNuremberg, though these origin
myths are unsettled by an emerging strand of literature on this field’s history; see for
example K.J. Heller and G. Simpson, The Hidden Histories of War Crimes Trials (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2013).
16 On what she terms the ‘tribunalization of African violence’, see K. Clarke, Fictions of
Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Challenge of Legal Pluralism in Sub-
Saharan Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
17 M. Mamdani, Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror (New York:
Doubleday, 2010); A. Branch, Displacing Human Rights: War and Intervention in
Northern Uganda (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
18 S. Nouwen and W. Werner, ‘Doing Justice to the Political: The International Criminal in
Uganda and Sudan’, European Journal of International Law, 21 (2010), 941–965.
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‘Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse
of Power’ provided a foundation for Rome Statute negotiations concern-
ing victims’ participatory and reparative rights at the ICC. When the
Security Council invoked ‘the responsibility to protect’ in its resolution
referring the Libyan conflict to the ICC, the growing relationship
between humanitarian discourse and criminal accountability was made
explicit.19
As restorative aims become formalised, international criminal law is
now regarded as a site of humanitarian practice as well as a means of
accountability and deterrence. Recent scholarship has argued that differ-
ent bodies of law have become more consolidated around a notion of
‘humanity’ as a legal subject – a subject that, in the words of the
Nuremberg Military Tribunal, ‘is able to assert itself by law’. David
Luban points out the plurality of meanings now attributed to the work
of international criminal law:
in addition to the familiar quartet of retribution-deterrence-incapacita-
tion-rehabilitation, ICL recognizes other purposes, and these raise pro-
blems of their own. The curious feature about ICL is that in it the
emphasis shifts from punishments to trials. Thus it is often said that the
goal of ICL lies in promoting social reconciliation, giving victims a voice,
or making a historical record of mass atrocities to help secure the past
against deniers and revisionists.20
The ICC has gone the farthest among hybrid and international courts
and tribunals in institutionalising restorative objectives. It has adopted
statutory provisions establishing participatory and reparatory rights for
victims of international crimes, thus formalising the presence of huma-
nitarian objectives in this retributive legal frame.21
Court proponents invoke conflict-affected communities and what
Kamari Clarke calls ‘the specter of the victim’ as normative justifications
for their work.22 ICC prosecutor Fatou Bensouda has claimed that ‘the
sole raison d’être of the Court’s activities . . . is the victims and the justice
they deserve’,23 suggesting that the telos of the ICC’s work is oriented
towards restorative rather than retributive purposes. Meanwhile, the
19 UNSC Res. 1970, 26 February 2011.
20 D. Luban, ‘Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of
International Criminal Law’, Georgetown Law Faculty Working Papers, 67 (2008), 8.
21 Article 63, Rome Statute. Article 75(2) empowers the Court to make a reparations order
against a convicted person; Article 79 establishes the Trust Fund for Victims. These rights
are taken up in greater detail in Chapter 13 by Dixon in this volume.
22 Clarke, Fictions of Justice, 22–23. 23 OTP Press Release, 20 July 2013.
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ICC’s president has stated that ‘the Rome Statute and the ICC bring
retributive and restorative justice together with the prevention of future
crimes’.24
Within international law there have been some efforts to account for a
more sanguine reading of the rise of the figure of the human. For
example, Ruti Teitel has argued that there is a legal conception of
humanity at play in the overlapping spaces between the law of war,
human rights law and international criminal law. Building upon the
ICTY appellate chamber’s assertions in the Tadic decision, Teitel claims
that ‘[t]he normative foundations of the international legal order have
shifted from an emphasis on state security – that is, security as defined by
borders, statehood, territory, and so on – to a focus on human security:
the security of persons and peoples’.25 Elaborating upon what she terms a
nascent ‘humanity law’, Teitel’s work offers an extended argument about
the growing commonalities between these legal fields since World War
II.26 The ICC features in this account as a vehicle through which inter-
national criminal law is brought into a closer relationship with conflict
management, forging connections between punishment and interna-
tional security.27 This account of the ICC does not take up other huma-
nitarian aspects of its work, however, such as the role of victim
participants and the Court’s Trust Fund, but instead claims a growing
convergence between different bodies of law. Read through the ‘human-
ity law’ frame, victim redress amounts to holding individual perpetrators
criminally accountable for human rights violations and violations of
international humanitarian law. Punishment itself is seen as a form of
redress.
In international criminal law more specifically, dominant interpreta-
tions of including restorative justice regard it as a progressive legal
development – a shift to incorporating victims’ needs within a field that
has historically relegated them to its margins. Much like progressive
histories of the field itself, this interpretation presumes a kind of huma-
nitarian teleology, where these practices are taken as signs that
24 Statement of President Song, 10 December 2012. 25 Teitel, Humanity’s Law, 4.
26 Richard Ashby Wilson also uses the ‘humanity law’ appellation to describe a cosmopo-
litan universalist jurisdiction; see ‘When Humanity Sits in Judgment: Crimes Against
Humanity and the Conundrum of Race and Ethnicity at the International Tribunal for
Rwanda’, in Feldman and Ticktin, In the Name of Humanity, 27–57.
27 Teitel argues that the ICC is ‘aimed at managing conflict worldwide’ – an objective that
‘links it to the prevailing interstate security regime’, particularly through the use of UN
Security Council referrals as a trigger for ICC jurisdiction. Teitel,Humanity’s Law, 89–90.
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international criminal law is becoming more responsive to conflict-
affected communities. In this account, victims have been traditionally
excluded from international criminal trials, with the ICC offering some-
thing of a paradigm shift in the recognition of victims’ rights and the
inclusion of restorative justice.28 As some observers have argued, the
involvement of victims ‘not only is a “right” but also appears indispens-
able if post-conflict justice processes are to be restorative and capable of
building the foundations for a strong transition through empowerment
of those who were victimized during conflict’.29
Rather than reading the emergence of these practices as they relate to
the field’s development, I contend that the ICC’s restorative dimension
should be interpreted within a wider frame, in relation to the rise of
humanitarian discourse across a range of different fields of knowledge
and sites of engagement. The discourse of restorative justice before the
ICC stretches beyond the framework of positive law. Claims about hear-
ing the voices of victims, restoring lost dignity and reconciling popula-
tions in the wake of conflict through the vehicle of international criminal
law exceed the terms available through the very law that supposedly
sustains these objectives.
Restorative justice in the humanitarian continuum
The ICC’s framework of restorative justice can be related to what has
been described above as ‘humanitarian government’30 and elsewhere as
‘humanitarian compassion’31 that may be deployed through various
‘regimes of care’.32 These terms have been used to refer to a diverse set
of practices, including pardons from truth commissions and the provi-
sion of medical assistance to asylum seekers, but these disparate practices
28 Conor McCarthy’s work on the role of victims at the ICC notes that ‘the idea of bringing
“justice to victims” was not of central concern to international criminal law at the
formative stage of its development’. See C. McCarthy, ‘Victim Redress and
International Criminal Justice: Competing Paradigms, or Compatible Forms of
Justice?’, Journal of International Criminal Justice, 10 (2012), 351–372; and
C. McCarthy, Reparations and Victim Support in the International Criminal Court
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
29 M. Pena and G. Carayon, ‘Is the ICC Making the Most of Victim Participation?’, The
International Journal of Transitional Justice, 7 (2013), 519, 518–535.
30 Fassin, Humanitarian Reason.
31 R. Meister, After Evil: A Politics of Human Rights (New York: Columbia University Press,
2011), 73.
32 M. Ticktin, Casualties of Care: Immigrants and the Politics of Humanitarianism in France
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 3.
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share underlying commonalities with the restorative turn in interna-
tional criminal law. Adequately grasping the stakes of the restorative
turn and its relation to humanitarianism thus requires taking up scholar-
ship that has addressed its historical emergence and its manifestation in
other fields, such as humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected popula-
tions and the provision of medical care to refugees. The restorative turn
can be seen as another site where humanitarian sentiment assumes
institutional and material forms. This wider optic helps to illustrate
some of humanitarianism’s presumptions and unintended consequences,
providing a way of viewing restorative justice in international law as part
of a constellation of activities –what we might think of as a humanitarian
continuum.33
Humanitarianism can be understood as the manifestation of compas-
sionate or moralising sentiments as political forces that appear through
practices, such as the provision of medical care to conflict-affected com-
munities. These practices produce effects among populations that are
perceived as vulnerable, whether due to their exposure to armed conflict,
poverty or repressive governments. Humanitarian sentiments appear
explicitly at the nexus of legal and policy discourse through doctrines
authorising the use of armed force, such as ‘humanitarian intervention’
and the ‘responsibility to protect’, which permit military intervention
where a state is seen to be manifestly failing to protect its population.34
These justifications for intervention are a more extreme consequence of
routing humanitarian logics through international law, but legal huma-
nitarianism also assumes more subtle forms, such as regimes of care
directed at conflict-affected populations. At all points on the continuum,
from military intervention to care provision, humanitarianism operates
as a form of governance: evaluating, deciding and implementing its
objectives, and producing divisions between selected and ‘untreated’
populations.
33 As with Michel Foucault’s notion of the ‘carceral continuum’, which contended that the
disciplinary techniques developed in prisons expanded throughout society, we might
think of a humanitarian continuum as the expansion of humanitarian logics into other
areas, such as international criminal law. See M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The
Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 1977). I thank Nesam McMillan for her
insights on this point.
34 See generally A. Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). For a historical account of humanitarian
intervention, see B. Simms and D.J.B. Trim (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention: A History
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
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The historical rise of humanitarianism predates the post-Cold War
expansion of international criminal law. Some accounts have located its
emergence in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when
what was previously taken as private acts of compassion emerged into the
public realm, animated by Enlightenment notions of progress and the
idea that the human condition could be taken as an object of improve-
ment.35 As Michael Barnett writes, ‘[w]hat distinguishes humanitarian-
ism from previous acts of compassion is that it is organized and part of
governance, connects the immanent to the transcendent, and is directed
at those in other lands.’36
Humanitarianism is torn between the desire to universalise on the one
hand and the attention to particular circumstance on the other. For
example, reports of the ICC’s Trust Fund emphasise the importance of
context in its work at the same time as they portray an abstract ‘African
victim’. The reports proclaim a kind of emancipation through the Trust
Fund’s regime of care – restoring dignity, acquiring knowledge about
rights – while also requiring individuals to accept and submit themselves
to the Trust Fund’s logic for targeting individuals and conflict-affected
communities, as Peter Dixon’s contribution to this volume illustrates in
greater detail.
While there is much emphasis on the emancipatory potential in Court
discourse and in the language of its proponents, international criminal
law’s restorative turn has hardly been considered as a form of governance
in the scholarship of international criminal law. Most work on the
inclusion of victims and conflict-affected communities in ICC jurispru-
dence and practice regard it as falling somewhere along a spectrum of
efficacy, ranging from a welcome development for the field through
extending victims’ rights on one end, to generating policy problems
and fair trial rights concerns on the other.37 Understanding the ways in
35 On the emergence of humanity as ‘sentiment’, see T. Laqueur, ‘Bodies, Details and
Humanitarian Narrative’, in L. Hunt (ed.), The New Cultural History (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1989), 176–204; and T. Laqueur, ‘Mourning, Pity, and
the Work of Narrative in the Making of “Humanity”’, in R. A. Wilson and R. Brown
(eds.), Humanitarianism and Suffering: The Mobilization of Empathy (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 31–57.
36 M. Barnett, Empire of Humanity, 21. The work of Didier Fassin andMiriam Ticktin tracks
how humanitarianism is deployed domestically as well, thus challenging Barnett’s claim
that it is directed outward as a form of governance.
37 See generally L. Moffet, Justice for Victims before the International Criminal Court
(London: Routledge, 2014); C. van den Wyngaert, ‘Victims Before International
Criminal Courts: Some Views and Concerns of an ICC Trial Judge’, Case Western
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which it governs individual survivors of mass violence as well as the
conflict-affected populations to which they belong calls for a broader
contextual view, locating its rootedness in liberal forms.
Our humanitarian present is marked by a liberal form of humanitar-
ianism that closely meshes with the discourse of human rights.38 Barnett
argues that contemporary humanitarianism is a ‘liberal humanitarian-
ism’ that began in the wake of the Cold War, characterised by efforts to
protect vulnerable populations and to prevent conflict through extending
democratic governance. The post-Cold War ascendance of international
criminal law can then be located in relation to its contemporary form of
liberal humanitarianism, both of which developed against the backdrop
of a particular human rights discourse that emerged during the ColdWar
period.39 As Kamari Clarke’s contribution to this volume elaborates, the
field expanded in conjunction with a liberal understanding of legality,
accompanied by ‘rule of law’ and ‘good governance’ initiatives.
International criminal law’s restorative turn sits within a broader field
of humanitarian activity, with links to concrete practices of intervention,
such as the ‘responsibility to protect’ and development agendas of donor
states.
This broader humanitarian continuum has also been subject to cri-
tique. Alex de Waal’s work on the paradoxes of humanitarianism illus-
trates how ‘the impulse to ameliorate suffering leads humanitarian
workers into the unwelcome situation of acting cruelly. While profes-
sional standards are increasing, thereby reducing suffering, some cruel-
ties are intrinsic to the humanitarian predicament – hence the
humanitarians’ tragedy.’40 De Waal elaborates that the ‘tragedy’ results
from irreconcilable goals and the constraints brought by the conditions
in which humanitarianism is carried out; cruelty is inevitably tied to
Reserve Journal of International Law, 44 (2011), 425; S. Vasiliev, ‘Article 68(3) and
personal interests of victims in the emerging practice of the ICC’, in Carsten Stahn and
Göran Sluiter (eds.), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Leiden:
Brill, 2009).
38 Barnett, Empire of Humanity, 167. David Chandler makes a similar claim, arguing that
the ‘transformation of humanitarianism from the margins to the centre of the interna-
tional policy-agenda has been achieved through the redefinition of humanitarian policy
and practice and its integration with the fast growing agenda of human rights’. See D.
Chandler, ‘The Road to Military Humanitarianism: How the Human Rights NGOs
Shaped ANewHumanitarian Agenda’,Human Rights Quarterly, 23 (2001), 678, 678–700.
39 See S. Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Harvard: Harvard University
Press, 2012); as well as Meister, After Evil.
40 A. de Waal, ‘The Humanitarians’ Tragedy: Escapable and Inescapable Cruelty’, Disasters,
34(2) (2010), 130, 131–37.
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decision-making in the face of suffering, where some lives will be saved
and others will be lost. Sarah Nouwen picks up this point specifically in
relation to the field of international criminal law when she argues that it
also harbours a certain cruelty: it overstates its own ability to bring about
an end to conflict; it operates according to logics of selection that belie its
presumed political neutrality; and it necessarily privileges accountability
over negotiated settlement, an aim that may itself beget further
violence.41
As the following sections illustrate, the gap between the rhetorical
promise and material practice of international criminal law as a form of
restorative justice produces new divisions: between court-recognised
victims and general (unrecognised) victims of a conflict, and between
beneficiaries of ICC ‘targeting’ and those whose suffering falls outside
selected categories of assistance. By extension, such divisions may form
the basis for new forms of grievance when they are mapped across
conflict-affect communities.
Victim participation as legal humanitarianism
The most apparent forms of legal humanitarianism at the ICC appear in
the Court’s efforts to engage with victims. Here the link between inter-
national criminal law and human rights law is made explicitly, as some
commentators have claimed that the appearance of victims’ rights in the
ICC statute shows a ‘complementarity between international criminal
law and international human rights law’.42 The restorative mandate of
the ICC’s work, considered in the following section, provides another
location for an emergent legal humanitarianism. Here recognition by
and inclusion within the legal process is presented as a form of empow-
erment – indeed, as a right – as well as a humanitarian practice of
alleviating suffering. As one ICC representative suggested publicly, vic-
tim participation can be regarded a form of reparation or redress.43
41 S. Nouwen, ‘Justifying Justice’, in J. Crawford andM. Koskenniemi (eds.), The Cambridge
Companion to International Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012),
327–351.
42 FIDH, ‘Enhancing Victims’ Rights Before the ICC: A View from Situation Countries on
Victims’ Rights at the International Criminal Court’ (November 2013), 8, referencing ICJ
Judge A. Trinidade, The Access of Individuals to International Justice (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2011), 201–204.
43 Paolina Massida, Head of the ICC Office of Public Counsel for Victims, presentation at
conference ‘Reparations before the International Criminal Court’, The Hague, 12 May
2011, author’s notes.
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Yet the field of potential beneficiaries of the ICC’s restorative work is
circumscribed from the moment the Court intervenes in a situation
country. When the prosecutor determines what crimes to investigate
and what arrest warrants to issue, there are effects at the level of jurisdic-
tional criteria and evidentiary assessments. For the Court’s restorative
mandate, or what some official ICC documents have termed ‘its mandate
regarding victims’,44 this manifests as restrictions on who qualifies as a
court-recognised victim for purposes of participation. This leads to a
form of ‘juridified victimhood’ – namely, the use of legal criteria to
determine an individual’s status as a victim.45 Victimhood in this sense
becomes an identity that is regulated through jurisdictional standards,
such as time and place and the subject matter of crimes. When charges
are dropped, as was the case against Uhuru Kenyatta in the Kenyan
situation, this has broader implications for victim participation: former
‘case victims’ are then regarded as ‘situation victims’, with fewer partici-
patory rights. From the standpoint of conflict-affected communities, the
use of legal categories to determine one’s qualification as a victim may
seem arbitrary at best, and quite possibly as manifesting an institutional
indifference to suffering.
Some critical scholarship has noted the shortcomings of the Court’s
victim participation regime.46 Others have welcomed victim participa-
tion in principle, offering suggestions for greater inclusion.47 To be
sure, there could be ways of modifying the ICC’s practices within its
existing legal frameworks that may assist it in achieving greater recogni-
tion of those who have suffered the effects of the crimes it seeks to
prosecute. However, what I contend here is that the Court’s very point
of departure – its work within legal and jurisdictional categories –
produces institutional limitations to the recognition that it might grant.
44 ICC-ASP/11/38, ‘Court’s Revised Strategy in Relation to Victims’, 5 November 2012, 2.
45 See generally S. Kendall and S. Nouwen, ‘Representational Practices at the International
Criminal Court: The Gap Between Juridified and Abstract Victimhood’, Law and
Contemporary Problems, 76(3–4) (2014), 235–262.
46 See note 37 for examples of this literature.
47 J. Wemmers, ‘Where Do They Belong? Giving Victims a Place in the Criminal Justice
Process’, Criminal Law Forum, 20 (2009), 395–416; M. Pena, ‘Victim Participation at the
International Criminal Court: Achievements Made and Challenges Lying Ahead’, ILSA
Journal of International and Comparative Law, 16 (2010), 497–516; S. Garkawe, ‘Have
Recent Changes Designed to Benefit Victims of International Crimes Added to the
Legitimacy of International Criminal Justice?’, in G. Boas, W. Schabas, and M. Scharf
(eds.), International Criminal Justice: Legitimacy and Coherence (Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar, 2012), 269–303.
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The way in which victim participation is enacted in practice illustrates
some of these shortcomings, which are not only matters of policy but also
inherent to the juridical form.
Implementing the Rome Statute’s victim participation provisions has
involved a considerable amount of reflexivity among actors, who have
adjusted and re-adjusted their practices in relation to resource constraints
and other challenges that they have faced sur le terrain. In order to be
granted status as victimparticipants, conflict-affected individualsmustfirst
be informed of the possibility that they may seek recognition before the
Court. This assumes a number of prior interventions: interaction with the
Court’s outreach section, for example, as well as contact with members of
the ICC’s Victim Participation and Reparations Section (VPRS) or their
‘intermediary’ partners.48 It is only through these channels that the con-
flict-affected individual will come into contact with the participation forms
that will enable his or her claim to the participatory rights to be adjudicated
before the Court. As the head of VPRS has noted, ‘[a] major challenge is
how to inform victims about the ICC in general as well as about their own
possible role as participants’, and ‘how to process potentially large numbers
of application forms from victims’.49 Judges in the Kenyan situation
instituted an alternative model for attaining recognition as a victim parti-
cipant, which they claimed they made ‘for practical reasons’;50 however, as
the majority of situations to date require the adjudication of individual
victim participation forms, most individuals receive (or are denied) recog-
nition by the ICC through the process described here.
Victim participation forms must be filled out in such a way that the
individual is able to establish a nexus between the harms she or he has
suffered and the charged crimes.51 Forms work as ‘actants’ in the sense
that they produce effects;52 through the very act of filling in a form,
48 On the role of intermediaries in the ICC’s work, see Dierdre Clancy’s contribution to this
volume.
49 F. McKay, ‘Victim Participation in Proceedings Before the International Criminal Court’,
Human Rights Brief, 15(3) (2008), 4–5.
50 Decision on Victims’ Representation and Participation, The Prosecutor v.William Samoi
Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Trial Chamber V, ICC, 3 October
2012, para 30.
51 For an elaboration of the role of the form in the production of victimary identity at the
ICC, see S. Kendall, ‘Archiving Victimhood: Practices of Inscription in International
Criminal Law’, in S. Motha and H. van Rijswijk (eds.), Law, Memory, Violence:
Uncovering the Counter-Archive (London: Routledge, 2016).
52 B. Latour, Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy (Harvard: Harvard
University Press, 2004).
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conflict-affected individuals are brought into a state of waiting. The
Court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence requires that applications
must be submitted to the prosecution and the defence before a judicial
determination is made, and sometimes the relevant chamber can take
years to provide applicants with a response. The VPRS section has
publicly explained that ‘[v]arying types of application form and applica-
tion process [sic] have been adopted by different Chambers. Responding
to these is, in the short term, having an impact on the workload of the
section as it involves designing different forms and processes and mod-
ifying the reporting system and database each time.’53 As one experi-
enced commentator who worked extensively with VPRS has noted, ‘the
application process has been long and cumbersome for all parties
involved, including victims’.54 Backlogs are widely reported by Court
staff, and are even noted in official Court documents.55 These backlogs
can have chilling effects on the efforts by potential participants to exercise
their participatory rights under the Rome Statute. For example, the
inability to process and adjudicate forms before significant events on
the judicial calendar has resulted in hundreds of individuals not receiving
a determination from the Court before the confirmation of charges
hearing in the Mbarushimana case in 2011.56
In the Ugandan situation, over eight years after arrest warrants were
issued as of the time of writing, Court-recognised victims have not been
able to actively exercise their participatory rights apart from at a con-
firmation of charges hearing in 2008. Many applicants for participant
status have not heard back about their applications after years of waiting.
In December 2013, field office staff members undertook a ‘mission’ to
northern Uganda for several weeks to engage with conflict-affected
communities. Before the trip, an outreach officer described this as a
‘commemoration ceremony’ in northern Uganda for all individuals
who had applied for victim participant status or had communicated
with the Court. The term was later abandoned, as some judges
53 Proposed programme budget for 2014 of the International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/12/
10, Included in Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, Twelfth Session, Official Records Volume II, para 537.
54 Pena, ‘Victim Participation’, 511.
55 For example, a 2012 ASP resolution noted ‘with continued concern reports from the Court
on the persistent backlogs the Court has had in processing applications from victims
seeking to participate in proceedings’; see Resolution ICC-ASP/11/Res.7, ‘Victims and
Reparations’, 21 November 2012.
56 REDRESS, ‘Hundreds of Victims Prevented from Participating in Crucial Court Hearings
Due to lack of Resources at the International Criminal Court’, Press Release, 15 July 2011.
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purportedly did not think the language of ‘commemoration’ was appro-
priate. Another staff member who had participated in the meetings said
that they were intended to ‘celebrate [the victims’] resilience in this
process’, but that the purpose of the meeting was primarily directed
toward clarifying the Court’s ‘maintenance strategy’ as it decreased its
field presence in Uganda rather than towards commemorating victims.57
Meanwhile, intermediaries were discouraged from submitting more par-
ticipation forms although the Court was technically still required to
accept new participant applications. There was a general impression
that the Court was at capacity, unable to take on more potential victim
participants in the Ugandan situation in light of the other contexts where
it had intervened.
In conversations over the past several years, members of civil society
organisations have noted the frustrations of conflict-affected commu-
nities who had been hearing the same messages since the Court had
started working in Uganda – the promise of participatory rights, assis-
tance and reparation that were always over the horizon and rarely
materialising in practice. Meanwhile, in the Kenyan context, changes to
the system of victim participation have resulted in the creation of a two-
tiered system of Court-recognised victims: those entitled to participate,
as in other situations, and those whose details are noted in a ‘register’
maintained by the Court, which operates rather like a closed archive.
Inaccessible to relief agencies and to the Court’s affiliated Trust Fund, the
register contains identifying details of individuals as well as information
about their suffering. Common legal representatives for victims have
access to information from registered victims and may use this as a
basis for identifying potential victim participants; the information gath-
ered about individuals who are not candidates for participation form part
of a mass of information to be used by legal representatives in making
general claims regarding victims’ interests and concerns. Ultimately,
however, the language used by the decision renders even this information
potentially irrelevant; in specifying that ‘all victims, regardless of whether
they have registered or not, will be represented through common legal
representation’58 while the case is at trial, the decision at least discursively
collapses the distinction between registered and non-registered victims.
While individuated guilt remains at the centre of international criminal
57 Interview with ICC field office staff, Kampala, 6 February 2014.
58 Proposed programme budget for 2014 of the International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/12/
10, para 52.
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law, it would seem that individuated suffering – a premise of legal
humanitarianism – is more tenuous than it may appear in claims made
through ICC documents.
Official texts reveal the tensions in translating the ambitions of legal
humanitarianism into practice. For example, the ICC’s 2012 ‘revised
strategy in relation to victims’ maintains that it incorporates a ‘rights
based perspective’ that ‘reconfirms and empowers the victim as a vital
actor in the justice process rather than a passive recipient of services and
magnanimity’.59 The text contains an extensive annex listing the ‘rights
and prerogatives’ of victims at various stages of the Court process,
enumerated under a heading entitled ‘right or possibilities’. The list of
nearly 100 items reinforces the difficulty of carrying out the ‘strategic
objective’ of communicating ‘rights as victims in relation to the elements
of the ICC system and at all steps of the judicial process’.60 Furthermore,
given the Court’s shifting jurisprudence on precisely these rights and
prerogatives/possibilities, how can the ICC ensure that the individual
victim remains a vital actor rather than a passive recipient of legal
recognition and assistance?
Such observations are not meant to diminish the extensive efforts by
some members of Court staff to produce a system in line with this rights-
based perspective, nor the efforts by non-governmental organisations
and ICC ‘intermediaries’ to improve the system through Court channels
or through informal attempts to compensate for formal shortcomings.
The overarching issue is more systemic, in the sense that the legal field
itself is bound by restrictions that undergird its efforts to engage in
humanitarian practices. This is more evident with the Court’s most
overt attempts to engage in legal humanitarianism through the work of
its Trust Fund.
Producing productive subjects: the ICC Trust Fund’s
assistance mandate
Even more than victim participation, which is largely articulated as a
matter of rights grounded in the Rome Statute, the ICC’s Trust Fund
serves as an exemplary instance of legal humanitarianism, providing
selective assistance to conflict-affected individuals and populations that
59 ICC/ASP/11/38, ‘Court’s Revised strategy in relation to victims’, 5 November 2012,
para. 6.
60 Ibid., para. 18.
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fall broadly within the Court’s jurisdiction. The Trust Fund is not
technically located within the ICC’s institutional structure; rather, the
ICC and TFV are regarded as ‘complementary institutions’.61 The Trust
Fund claims its institutional mission is ‘to support programs, which
address the harm resulting from the crimes under the jurisdiction of
the ICC by assisting victims to return to a dignified and contributory life
within their communities’, with an overarching goal ‘to relieve the
suffering of victims’.62 This relief is carried out through two distinct
mandates: first, through implementing reparations awards (not consid-
ered here, but taken up in Peter Dixon’s contribution to this volume); and
second, ‘to provide victims and their families in situations under Court
jurisdiction with physical rehabilitation, psychological rehabilitation,
and/or material support’.63
Taken together, the contributions fromKamari Clarke, Laurel Fletcher
and Peter Dixon in this volume cover significant aspects of the Trust
Fund’s work in practice, including the kinds of programmes it supports
in select ICC situation countries as well as the politics of ‘targeting’
beneficiaries. They illustrate the risks of re-inscribing categories of
identity by privileging certain communities over others, a concern that
was also voiced by non-governmental organisations working in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, whose representatives claimed that
among the local population the Court was seen to be favouring certain
communities.64 Building upon the observations from previous chapters,
this section seeks to show how the provision of assistance to conflict-
affected communities, as a form of legal humanitarianism, is constrained
by juridical logics that limit its work. If the Trust Fund is ‘like a donor’,65
in the words of one of its representatives, what kind of donor might it be?
Reading the Trust Fund’s work in relation to critical literature on the
provision of humanitarian assistance reveals the ways in which legal
humanitarianism works to govern conflict-affected populations.
Anthropologists studying the practices of humanitarianism have
shown how efforts to alleviate suffering are bound up with relations of
power and interest. Didier Fassin’s scholarship provides a grounded
account of the work of the humanitarian organisation Médecins sans
Frontières (MSF), illustrating the unintended consequences of decisions
to prioritise certain forms of assistance over others (the provision of food
61 TFV Programme Progress Report, Summer 2014, 3, emphasis added. 62 Ibid., 4.
63 Ibid. 64 Interview with representatives of an INGO, Kinshasa, 20 June 2011.
65 Interview with Trust Fund representative, Kampala, 25 October 2011.
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over medical treatment, for example) and valuing certain lives over
others (those of the humanitarian care providers over the populations
they are treating). Fassin points to a paradox that he claims is embedded
within humanitarianism:
Humanitarianism is founded on an inequality of lives and hierarchies of
humanity. This profound contradiction between the noble goals of huma-
nitarian action (saving endangered others and alleviating suffering every-
where in an indiscriminate manner) and the concrete terms under which
humanitarian agents have to operate (producing inequalities and hier-
archies) is not the result of dysfunction of the humanitarian organizations
or the misbehavior or their agents: it is an aporia of humanitarian
governmentality.66
Fassin’s critique of humanitarianism begins from noting its point of
departure within a framework of inequality. Those who carry out the
work of humanitarianism are structurally separated from those who are
thought to benefit from this work, a fact that is most starkly illustrated
when the lives of humanitarian aid providers are prioritised over those
they treat when situations relapse into conflict. This has been the case at
the ICC, as when staff members have ceased implementing Trust Fund
assistance in the Central African Republic at various points due to
security concerns. In Kenya the Trust Fund’s presence has been deferred
for years, with prospects of a preliminary ‘assessment mission’ discussed
as early as 2011 and slated for early 2012,67 whereas a 2014 programme
progress report asserted that ‘an assessment mission to Kenya is planned
for 2015 depending on security protocols and travel guidelines’.68 A
representative of the Trust Fund explained that the delay was first due
to jurisdictional issues and then continued due to security concerns,
noting that Kenya has become a very dangerous environment for
human rights defenders.69 Meanwhile, domestic civil society partners
have continued to work in support of the ICC’s presence in Kenya, with
one member of a leading non-governmental organisation remarking that
‘everybody’s life in the Court becomes more precious than is ordinarily
the case’.70
66 D. Fassin, ‘Inequality of Lives, Hierarchies of Humanity: Moral Commitments and
Ethical Dilemmas of Humanitarianism’, in Feldman and Ticktin, In the Name of
Humanity, 239.
67 Interview with Trust Fund representative, Kampala, 25 October 2011.
68 TFV Programme Progress Report, Summer 2014, 35.
69 Interview with Trust Fund representative, Kampala, 6 February 2014.
70 Interview with member of Kenyan NGO, Nairobi, 30 November 2012.
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In addition to privileging some lives over others, humanitarian actors
further inscribe the division between themselves as agentic subjects and
the suffering populations whom they seek to treat through making the
very assessments that are necessary for targeting beneficiaries. By classi-
fying and categorising populations based upon treatment priorities,
humanitarianism produces hierarchies and inequalities that belie its
egalitarian ambitions, as the work of Alex de Waal and Didier Fassin
has shown. Fassin claims that rather than a product of individual deci-
sion-making (‘dysfunction’ or ‘misbehavior’), this contradiction between
humanitarianism’s ‘noble goals’ and its work in practice is instead an
‘aporia’, an impasse or doubt, intrinsic to humanitarian governance.
Relatedly, Ilana Feldman and Miriam Ticktin have argued that ‘humani-
tarian organizations often find themselves in the business of governing –
managing, servicing – the populations they seek to aid’.71
Much like humanitarian aid provision, the restorative turn in interna-
tional criminal law also harbours a contradiction between its ambitious
goals of redressing wrongs on a broad scale and its relatively limited
manifestations at the level of practice. To be sure, some issues arise from
limitations that appear as products of institutional practice, particularly
among large multi-sited institutions like the ICC, with field offices
maintaining reporting relationships with The Hague, where most policy
decisions are taken. As Trust Fund representatives have pointed out, the
process of selecting proposals for recipients of funding is ‘bureaucratic’
and time-consuming.72 For example, the Trust Fund’s activities in the
Democratic Republic of Congo does not have a physical rehabilitation
mandate because it was not originally requested from the chamber; to
attempt to add one would take considerable time.73 However, what
Fassin notes regarding the work of MSF holds for the ICC as well: rather
than merely a product of bureaucratic dysfunction or staff decisions
within the Court, the contradiction between legal humanitarianism’s
ambitious goals and limited practices is intrinsic, arising from a more
fundamental tension between international criminal law and restorative
conceptions of justice. Just as the universalist sentiment undergirding
humanitarian assistance – to aid all those who suffer – runs up against
71 I. Feldman and M. Ticktin, ‘Government and Humanity’, in Feldman and Ticktin (eds.),
In the Name of Humanity, 13.
72 Interview with Trust Fund representative, Kampala, 6 February 2014.
73 To add a physical rehabilitation mandate would require filing a request with the Court,
which would then have 45 days to decide on the proposal, and observations would need to
be made by all parties. Interview with Trust Fund representative, Kampala, 12 July 2012.
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practical constraints, producing hierarchies and exclusions along the
way, the restorative sentiment at play in the ‘victims’ mandate’ of the
ICC meets the juridical constraints of a field that is fundamentally
designed to classify and categorise.
In international criminal law, such acts of classification and categor-
isation typically entail affixing criminal labels to forms of behaviour and
locating individuals within hierarchies of command. Juridical classifica-
tion ascribes modes of liability, differentiates forms of crime and deter-
mines what subjects, acts and periods of time fall within the scope of an
institution’s jurisdiction. The form of governance performed here entails
sorting and differentiation, distinguishing which deeds amount to
‘crimes of greatest concern to the international community’ and which
bodies will appear before the law. When directed at the level of the
population, however, these categories perform additional forms of gov-
ernance. Borrowing from Michel Foucault, we can conceptualise such
governance as a kind of ‘biopower’, intervening at the collective level
(here, among conflict-affected populations) to promote life and health.74
Unlike other theorisations of ‘biopower’ that would regard it as a repres-
sive form of power, such as the sovereign power to suspend the law,75
Foucault regarded biopower as productive power, in the sense that it was
oriented towards producing greater vitality in the populations towards
which it was directed.76 Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century forms
included developing biopolitical strategies for intervening to improve
birth rates and control epidemics; we might regard twentieth- and
twenty-first-century humanitarian practices that seek to alleviate suffer-
ing through providing medical care and livelihood support as contem-
porary forms. Generally biopower sought to ‘produce and regulate ways
of maximizing the capacities of both the population and the individual as
the target of power’;77 similarly, according to the official Trust Fund
narrative, the purpose of physical rehabilitation is ‘to address the care
and rehabilitation of those victims who have suffered physical injury, in
74 See M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: The Will to Knowledge (London:
Penguin, 1978); and M. Foucault, Society must be defended: Lectures at the Collège de
France, 1975–76 (New York: Picador, 2002).
75 G. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1998).
76 Foucault’s work historicises this form of power, beginning with its emergence in the
seventeenth century and consolidation in the nineteenth century. There is a vast second-
ary literature on Foucault’s notion of biopower and biopolitics, and addressing it is
beyond the scope of this chapter.
77 P. Rabinow and N. Rose, ‘Biopower Today’, Biosocieties, 1 (2006), 199, 195–217.
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order to recover and resume their roles as productive and contributing
members of their societies’.78
Through reading Trust Fund interventions in this light, as forms of
governance, we can see the ways in which legal humanitarianism seeks to
support and manage the lives of those who fall within its jurisdiction. A
telling example is the case of Mary, a pseudonym used to designate a
woman from northern Uganda, whose narrative is recounted in a Trust
Fund annual report. According to the report, Mary ‘became actively
involved in economically-productive activities’ following Trust Fund-
supported counselling.79 Here the Trust Fund’s embeddedness in a
liberal conception of subjectivity – the norm of the productive, self-
reliant subject – reveals the broader backdrop of ‘liberal humanitarian-
ism’, in Barnett’s words, in which Trust Fund interventions transpire.
This focus on economic productivity is coupled with an emphasis on
psychic well-being: ‘[e]ngaging herself in defence of her own rights has
strengthened her sense of purpose and happiness and has been an
important part of her remarkable recovery’.80 All Trust Fund interven-
tions include a ‘psychosocial’ dimension, such as counselling, in addition
to medical or livelihood support.81 In this way the Trust Fund draws
upon therapeutic discourse, casting suffering as trauma and thereby
extending the reach of psychological responses to material harm.
Finally, as Peter Dixon’s chapter recounts, the Trust Fund operates
through practices of ‘targeting’ that direct care towards particular indi-
viduals and communities. In the case of the Trust Fund’s medical inter-
ventions, a representative explained that the Trust Fund tries to address
individuals who have injuries that are ‘emblematic of the conflict’, such as
burn victims and amputees in the context of northern Uganda.82 A Gulu-
based observer of the Trust Fund’s work noted that the Trust Fund was
known for supporting reconstructive surgery and prosthetics, but was
not well known for treating other conflict-related conditions.83 Here
conflict-related suffering is placed on a spectrum of what can be regarded
as most ‘emblematic’, and treatment priorities are determined in relation
to that spectrum. As a second Trust Fund staffmember observed, ‘we are
not a humanitarian body’;84 legal humanitarianism faces the constraints
of the juridical form. Even the Trust Fund, whose work is not restricted
78 TFV Programme Progress Report, Summer 2014, 5. 79 Ibid., 32. 80 Ibid.
81 Interview with Trust Fund representative, Kampala, 9 December 2011. 82 Ibid.
83 Interview with Justice and Security Research Programme researcher, Gulu, 8 February
2014.
84 Interview with Trust Fund representative, Kampala, 12 July 2012.
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by the need to establish a nexus to charged crimes, still regards its
interventions as responding to harms rather than to needs.
Conclusion: beyond humanitarian governance
The globalization of compassion meant a view of humanity based on the
figure of the victim.85
In Discipline and Punish, Michel Foucault argued that ‘[t]oday, crim-
inal justice functions and justifies itself only by this perpetual reference to
something other than itself, by this unceasing reinscription in non-
juridical systems’.86 In the case of international criminal law, this ‘some-
thing other’ appears increasingly as the figure of the victim, the object of
legal humanitarianism. It would seem that the logic of punitive justice is
not enough to legitimate the political and material investments of states
in the field of international criminal law, requiring a humanitarian
supplement to the objectives of institutions such as the ICC.
As a form of humanitarian governance, the ICC’s victim mandate
produces a regime of care – an institutionalisation of what Judith
Butler calls ‘precarious life’, which is then governed and managed and
attended to (or not).87 Governance is not always carried out by states (or
by the Court), but also by non-state actors, by technologies of inscription
such as victim participation forms, and through practices of adjudication,
with their associated deferrals in line with the slow pace of juridical time.
The conduits of legal humanitarianism are diverse, as the Court
describes:
A wide range of actors including States Parties, local authorities, non-
governmental and community based organisations, as well as international
organisations have been and continue to be instrumental in bringing about
an increased awareness of victims’ rights, as well as in enabling them to
realise their rights.Wherever possible the Court seeks to identify a common
approach and to coordinate with the above actors.88
A plurality of actors participate in implementing the Court’s ‘victim
mandate’ and, by extension, in disseminating its associated views about
85 Weizman, The Least of All Possible Evils, 38.
86 M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage Books,
1977), 22.
87 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London: Verso,
2004).
88 ICC-ASP/11/38, ‘Court’s Revised Strategy in Relation to Victims’, 5 November 2012, 4.
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the utility of routing restorative justice through retributive law. As this
chapter has illustrated, these interventions are consequential: they pro-
duce expectations about what the field of international criminal law
enables; expectations that are to be ‘managed’, according to official ICC
documents,89 but which nonetheless may be experienced as a form of
institutional indifference bordering on cruelty. Staff working for the
VPRS section must explain that specific forms of suffering will not be
compensated, as when an aspiring victim participant requests compensa-
tion for lost livestock in response to a query on the participation form.
Some applicants for victim participation in the Ugandan situation have
filed forms in 2006 and continue to await formal recognition.90 Others in
the Kenyan situationmust be informed by Court staff that their status has
changed from case to situation victim, with an attendant loss of partici-
patory rights.
These practices of participation and assistance, animated by humani-
tarian sentiments and seeking to carve out a space for restorative justice
within a retributive legal framework, are themselves modes of govern-
ance. They classify conflict-affected populations; for example, into
groups with participatory rights at the ICC and those who fall outside
its jurisdiction, and those whose wounds are regarded as emblematic
and those whose are not. The Court has recognised the perils of imple-
menting victims’ rights through the Rome Statute, arguing that it needs
to exceed the Hippocratic imperative to ‘do no harm’ and address the
conflict-affected individual as ‘a rights-holder to whom the duty-bearer –
in this case, the Court, the TFV, and the Rome Statute system – owes an
obligation it must fulfil’.91 Yet in spite of these aspirational sentiments,
the Court is constrained by its innate identity as a legal institution, bound
to perpetually reinscribe the categories and classifications that inform its
very being. To overcome this requires a step beyond the positivism of the
Rome Statute system towards a broader notion of equity and responsive-
ness to the communities who most directly experienced the suffering
wrought through the crimes the Court seeks to adjudicate – a step that
may not be possible within the juridical frame of the ICC.
89 A policy document on external relations includes among its goals ‘managing expecta-
tions’; see ICC, ‘Integrated Strategy for External Relations, Public Information and
Outreach’.
90 Interview of VPRS staff member, Kampala, 6 February 2014.
91 ICC/ASP/11/38, ‘Court’s Revised strategy in relation to victims’, 5 November 2012, 3.
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